Containment: 1949-1971
From 1949 to 1971, the relationship between the United States and China was characterized by a policy of containment, reflecting America's strategic response to the rise of communism in Europe and Asia. As such, this period witnessed diplomatic tensions, economic isolation, and intermittent engagement as both nations navigated ideological differences and stark geopolitical challenges.
October 1, 1949:
On this day, Communist forces led by Mao Zedong defeat Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist Army, who subsequently retreat to the island of Taiwan. Declaring the relocation of the nation's capital to Taipei, the Republic of China retained its seat in the United Nations Security Council. Having aided Nationalist forces counter Japanese invaders during WWII, the United States continued to recognize Taiwan as the sole "legitimate" China despite Mao's confident proclamation of victory.
Arranging a visit to Moscow in December of 1949, Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship to solidify China into the "Soviet bloc" (Pomfret 374). This action further contributed to mass anti-communist thought in the United States already proliferated by the concerns of communism spreading throughout Europe by the USSR. Dean Acheson, the 51st Secretary of State, put together a group of China experts and analysts to determine the course of action in response to Mao; the majority of said-experts urged that the U.S. pursue cordial relations with China's new leadership. After all, the U.S. must "ally itself with the forces of the future in Asia" (Pomfret 375). In brief, the committee argued that democracy and ideals of freedom were simply unattainable at that moment due to the state of upheaval and chaos in China, where the primary concern was one of survival. In all, the Chinese Communist Revolution had a tremendous on American political society: it once more encouraged the United States to build up their military, and it also introduced a new era of the "Yellow Peril" that already held its roots in early Chinese immigration along with the building of the Transcontinental Railroad in the U.S. a century earlier.
October 19, 1950:
The Chinese People's Volunteers cross the Yalu River into North Korea, marking China's entry into the Korean War. Despite U.S. orders to avoid China's borders, American forces underestimated the size of the Chinese military, which numbered around 260,000 (Cooker 5). This miscalculation contributed to the war's prolonged conflict and heightened tensions between the U.S. and China. While Chinese forces proceeded with initial success by the method of surprise, strong coordinated efforts between UN forces and the United States led to a staggering Chinese advance.
“The unification of Korea cannot be realized in a peaceful way; the unification of Korea must be realized by using force. As for the Americans, do not fear them. The Americans will not start the third world war for such a small place.” - Mao Zedong, January 1950
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The Korean War may be characterized as a conflict marked by miscalculations on both sides, and this statement by Mao Zedong is the first among them. Convinced the United States would not risk going to war shortly after the exhaustion caused by the Second World War, North Korean forces under the leadership of Kim Il-sung were prompted by the USSR to attack the American-supported South. The underestimation of the United State's unwavering commitment towards supporting the South Korean Army as part of its national policy of containment significantly contributed to the prolonging of the war. Yet, the United States also confronted their own misjudgments: Chinese premier Zhou Enlai warned that, if US-UN troops continue their advance towards the Chinese borders, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will intervene. Numerous American military advisors (most notably General MacArthur) dismissed Enlai's statement as bluff and/or propaganda, and called for American troops to proceed their operation northward. Yet, American intelligence advisors were well aware of the increased stationing of Chinese troops along the Yalu River, indicating this was not an intelligence failure. As mentioned previously, this action gave Chinese troops the advantage by usage of superior manpower and the element of surprise, significantly rewinding the advances made by US-UN troops. Lack of communication due to the United State's lack of formal diplomatic engagement with the PRC only fanned the flames of misunderstanding and logistical miscalculations on both sides. While Chinese leadership exaggerated the military power of the PLA, they strongly underestimated American battlefield tactics. On the other side, the United States held outdated assessments on Chinese military capabilities, using data and basing predictions upon the actions of the Chinese Nationalist Army during WWII (Cooker 8). Failure to communicate strategic goals, along with exaggeration and pride in one's military capabilities, helped contribute to the grueling stalemate of the Korean War. China's lack of advanced military equipment, limited logistical capabilities, and underestimation of American firepower would soon halt China's advance further south. While holding superior numbers of troops, this advantage could not make up for the operational inconsistencies and inaccurate military assessments conducted by the PRC.
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The effect of the war on Zedong's status as a whole cannot be left unsaid. While praised within the Central Committee of the CCP prior to the war, Mao emerged a hero across China after securing a stalemate against the most powerful military in the world, also allowing him to intensify and solidify China's new status internationally. As premier and foreign minister Zhou Enlai wrote, "Without such an enemy, we would not have been able to mobilize such strength". Interestingly, Enlai also acknowledged that getting the Chinese to despise the United States was among the most challenging pursuits the party had taken. Particularly seen in students and American-educated Chinese, many were unwilling to view America with hatred. A report from the Communist Youth League reports how, at the height of the anti-USA campaign, some still admired the educational opportunities brought about by the United States. Moreover, a report from the Beijing Federation of Trade Unions remarked how laborers marveled at America's industrial capacity and its production of high-quality goods. Despite the assault on American influences and institutions in China, these slivers of more neutral or positively-aligned sentiments towards the United States would persist beneath the masses of anti-American hysteria (Pomfret 387-388).
Painted as a campaign to combat American imperialist aggressions in support of their North Korean brothers, China's primary objective included the bolstering of the North Korean People's Army and its efforts to install communism in Korea by force. Within China itself, Mao utilized the war as justification for expelling all signs of American influence within society, whether it was found in academic and research facilities, cultural institutions (e.g. movie theaters, music), or churches. This anti-America campaign was launched under the proclamation to cure three "diseases" damaging Chinese society: kongmei bing (the disease of fearing America), chongmei bing (the disease of worshipping America), and meimei bing (the disease of flattering America) (Rudd 89). Sentiments within this campaign only solidified during the emerging stalemate between China and the U.S. In the words of Mao confidant Li Zhisui, this was "the first time in more than a century that China had engaged in a war with a foreign power without losing face". ​
As the Chinese Communist Party produced non-stop propaganda against the United States, the outbreak of the Korean War created a turbulent environment in America as different opinions about China—and the Chinese people as a whole—ensued. On one hand, it birthed a new age of the "yellow peril" that had been present in American society since the introduction of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. Yet, at the same time, Chinese immigration to the United States during this period increased rapidly. The Korean War also led to the development of a foreign policy that would dominate the next few decades of American diplomacy: the domino theory. In short, the theory reasoned that, if one nation fell to communism, it would cause the spread of communism into neighboring countries. This theory led the United State's urgency in establishing alliance structures such as the U.S-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954, along with increased American pursuits of interventionism, efforts best exemplified throughout nations in South America and Vietnam in the decades to come. Needless to say, enmity between the two nations endured a historical low point by the 1960s, only intensified by incidents such as the crises along the Taiwan Strait throughout the mid-1950s.​
